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Executive Summary
This report summarizes key economic issues surrounding climate change legislation and
regulation and considers potential implications for Nebraska, a state with a large agricultural
sector and a focused manufacturing industry. The key findings are listed below.
-

While economic theory supports the imposition of taxes or other costs on polluters,
effective policy requires the choice of an appropriate tax. Choice of an appropriate
tax can be difficult in the case of greenhouse gas emissions because there is
uncertainty about the economic costs of these emissions. There are two sources of
uncertainty. First, there is uncertainty about the magnitude of the manmade
contribution to global warming. Second, there is uncertainty about the extent to
which global warming will harm the economy.

-

The public may still choose to regulate and reduce greenhouse gas emissions in
order to reduce the risk of a severe economic outcome. However, when making such
a decision, there is a need to understand the economic cost of climate change
legislation or regulation.

-

For our analysis, we used the example of two recent climate change bills in the
United States House of Representatives (Waxman-Markey) and in the United States
Senate (Kerry-Lieberman). Our review of literature and analysis found that these
examples of cap and trade legislation would be most likely to lead to an approximate
2% reduction in U.S. GDP by the year 2030 relative to a reference scenario without
climate change legislation. Losses in U.S. GDP may be less severe in the decades
leading up to 2030, but would remain severe after 2030. The magnitude of the GDP
loss could be less if there is a rapid adoption of new nuclear or renewable power
capacity.

-

Retail electric prices also are expected to rise by 30% to 70% by 2030 under climate
change legislation. The manufacturing sector will be especially hard-hit, with a 5% to
7% decline in industrial output and manufacturing employment.

-

The economic consequences may be more muted in Nebraska given that the state is
less dependent on the type of energy-intensive, internationally competitive
i

manufacturing sectors that are expected to be hardest hit by increases in energy
prices. Nebraska also has a large agricultural sector that could be just lightly affected
if it is exempted from regulation and would benefit from the opportunity to sell
carbon offsets. However, it is uncertain as to whether these conditions would
prevail.

ii
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Chapter 1: Introduction
While the future of climate change policy in the United States is far from clear, it is fair
to say that there has been a lively and active debate on the subject over the last decade, and
even proposed legislative changes at the national and state level. For example, several versions
of climate change legislation were introduced in either the U.S. Senate or U.S. House of
Representatives during the 111th Congress. No version of climate change legislation became
law, but the magnitude of the efforts during the last Congress suggest that our country will
continue to debate potential approaches to limiting greenhouse gas emissions in the years to
come. Future legislation is likely to be proposed, and, while political support for large-scale
regulatory efforts may have waned in Washington, potential for regulatory action exists even in
the near term. Specifically, the Environmental Protection Agency also has considered directly
regulating carbon emissions. Enactment of such legislation or EPA action would have
consequences for the national and Nebraska economies. Further, there are active efforts in
many states to mandate renewable power use, a practice that would have many of the same
economic features as the climate change legislation recently considered in Congress.
This document is an effort to summarize key economic issues surrounding climate
change and consider the potential implications of climate change legislation or regulation for
Nebraska. We begin with a discussion of economic theory and principals that pertain to climate
change regulation (or air pollution in general). Such a theoretical discussion by its nature would
reveal criteria for identifying an economically efficient approach to addressing externalities (i.e.,
pollution) from greenhouse gas emissions. We also consider difficulties in measuring the
magnitude and timing of any costs to the economy from greenhouse gas emissions. Measuring
the characteristics of external costs is an obvious first step in designing an economically
efficient policy response.
We then consider the concrete proposals that have been developed to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions. We consider the impact on the economy from legislation introduced
in both the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate during the 111th Congress. This
legislation did not become law, but it provides a useful framework in which to consider the
1

national economic consequences from a cap and trade system to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions. Specifically, we review analyses that have been conducted by the U.S. Department
of Energy’s Energy Information Administration (EIA), as well as by private companies and
business associations. We consider the consequences of regulation on a number of key
economic variables such as energy prices, carbon prices, gross domestic product, and industrial
production. In our analysis, we place an emphasis on the impacts of legislation or regulation on
the electric power generation, agriculture, and manufacturing sectors. Following the planned
scope of our study, we spend less time considering the specific impacts of climate change
legislation and regulation on the transportation sector (although such impacts are included in
some of the aggregated economic impacts we identified in the literature).
Part of the reason for our interest in manufacturing and agriculture is that we also
examine the potential economic consequences of climate change legislation or regulation on
the Nebraska economy. Nebraska has a large and active agricultural sector that will face energy
and input cost increases under climate change legislation, but will also have substantial
potential to provide offsets for greenhouse gas emissions. Further, Nebraska’s mix of energy
producing assets is different than the national average, so that the impact on utilities and
energy prices may differ as well. Nebraska also has a lower concentration of the types of heavy
industries that will be most disadvantaged competitively by climate change legislation.

2

Chapter 2: Economic Theory
This chapter considers the consequences of climate change legislation and regulation
from an economics perspective. We examine the basic economic issues related to pollution
externalities, i.e., the types of pollution that sometimes accompany the production process and
may impact other members of society. We then consider issues regarding the measurement of
external costs for the case of greenhouse gas emissions, that is, the extent to which these costs
can be defined and measured. We conclude by examining a variety of points of emphasis from
the analysis. For example, the issue of discounting, or the process of putting the costs and
benefits of future events back into current terms. This is an important issue in the case of a type
of pollution that will have effects over the very long term. Another point of emphasis is the
issue of policy coverage. In other words, what are the economic consequences when a
regulatory policy is imposed on only a portion of the market? This is relevant in the case of U.S.
climate change legislation and regulation to the extent that new regulation primarily will be
imposed in the United States.

A. Basic Theory
An externality is generated when a transaction that occurs between a buyer and seller
also impacts a third party. In the case of a negative externality produced by the activity of a
seller (we will use the term externality to imply negative externality in this report), the seller
typically does not consider the costs being imposed on a third party. Therefore, the price at
which the seller is willing to supply a good or service does not consider the full costs to society.
The full social costs would include both the private production costs and these external costs.
This situation is illustrated below in Figure 2.1, which shows both the private supply curve and
the social supply curve for a seller who produces and sells a good that also generates a negative
externality during the production process. Assume the example in Figure 2.1 represents U.S.
electricity production. Electric power producers generate power using a variety of fuels and
technologies, but many modes of generation also create pollution that impact households
3

located around the country. In this example, the electric power plant is the supplier, regional
households, commercial businesses, and industrial firms are the customers, and the third party
is households throughout the nation who face more pollution. The private supply curve for the
electric power producer reflects the private costs for producing electric power, such as labor
costs or the costs of purchasing fuel. The social supply curve reflects these private costs as well
as the cost imposed on the third party: the households who face greater pollution. Note that in
the example in Figure 2.1, these pollution costs rise faster than the cost of electricity
generation, so the difference between the social supply curve and the private supply curve
grows over time (Van den Berg, 2011(forthcoming)). This could occur if the externality costs of
pollution grow rapidly as the pollution concentrates.
Left on its own, the electric power generating industry would choose to produce at the
point A. This is the price where the private supply curve meets the demand curve. However, if
the private producers are required to consider the costs imposed on the third party (i.e., if
these external costs are “internalized” through some mechanism, such as a tax on production),
then the private producers will supply electric power according to the social supply curve and
will choose point B where the social supply curve meets the demand curve. Note that the
quantity of electricity produced is lower and the price is higher in the social equilibrium (point
B) compared to the private equilibrium (point A). Internalizing externalities from production
raises prices and also reduces the quantity produced, though both production and pollution
continue at this lower, economically efficient level.
Lower levels of electricity production also may imply changes in the output of the
economy. Faced with higher prices, segments of the economy that utilize electricity, such as
households, commercial businesses, and industrial businesses, may reduce the quantity of
electricity they demand through adopting more energy efficient practices. For example, some
households may switch to energy-efficient appliances, while some commercial businesses
switch to energy-efficient lighting, and a manufacturing firm uses an energy audit to produce in
a more energy-efficient manner. This switch may reduce electricity consumption, but also may
raise costs and limit sales for these businesses. Business sales and activity also may decline to
4

the extent that businesses curtail energy use simply by producing less of their own goods and
services. In other words, the output of the economy would decline along with inputs into
production, including labor. This is the often-stated concern that efforts to reduce pollution in
electric power generation will raise energy prices and lower the output of the economy. 1
Figure 2.1
Equilibrium Production and Price With and Without Internalized Costs of Pollution

The loss in economic activity, however, could be less if alternative technologies exist
that can generate electric power without also generating pollution. In particular, electric power
producers may find that it is less costly to adopt this non-polluting method of power
generation. This alternative method would be more expensive (otherwise, it would have been
chosen initially), but could be less expensive than the combined cost of generating electricity
with the existing technology and paying a tax equal to the social cost of pollution.
This situation is depicted in Figure 2.2. In Figure 2.2, as the zero pollution technology is
adopted, the new private supply curve is the equivalent of the new social supply curve (since
there is no pollution externality). This private supply curve using the alternative, non-polluting
1

Note that social welfare would still be higher at point B even if the measured output of the economy declines.
This is because households would face fewer negative impacts from pollution (such as negative impacts on health),
which would raise the quality of life. Further, there may be other, positive impacts on measured economic output;
for example, a healthier population may miss fewer days of work due to illness.

5

technology is the curve SupplyALT. SupplyALT intercepts the demand curve at point C. Point C
represents a higher level of electricity generation and a lower price than point B. The more
modest increase in energy prices and the more modest decline in electricity production would
reflect a more modest decline in the output of the economy and related concepts, such as
employment. The amount of pollution also would decline much more than at point B given that
a large share of electric power would now be produced using the non-polluting technology. An
outcome such as point C would therefore be preferable to point B. But, the key issue is whether
a non-pollution technology exists that is sufficiently cost effective. If not, the SupplyALT curve
would lie above the original social supply curve and firms would prefer to continue to use the
polluting technology and pay the full social costs of pollution (i.e., point B), perhaps through a
tax or some other method to internalize the pollution externality.

Figure 2.2
Equilibrium Production and Price Adopting Alternative Energy Technologies

B. Another Example
What other methods might exist to internalize a pollution externality besides levying a
tax on electric power production or a cap and trade system (See Chapter 3)? One method that
is championed by economists to internalize pollution externalities is to assign property rights
6

for the entity that is polluted. In the case of air pollution from electric power generation, it is
impractical to assign property rights to the atmosphere; however, we consider another
example below where assigning property rights for the polluted entity may be feasible. The
advantage of assigning property rights for the polluted entity is that the owner of the polluted
entity would have standing to demand payment for the damage done to their asset. Economists
expect that this act would lead to an economically efficient outcome, assuming that transaction
costs are modest.
Consider the recreational lake that is being polluted by an adjacent factory. The
pollution limits the value of the lake for recreational purposes. This is the negative externality
resulting from the pollution.
If someone is permitted to purchase the lake, then the owner of that lake would have
standing to require a payment from the polluter for the ability to continue to pollute. That
payment would compensate for the loss in revenue to the lake in the form of admissions fees
by day visitors and the decline in the value of adjacent land for hotels and second homes
bordering a polluted lake. Such a payment would be subject to negotiation, but would need to
at least equal the damage that is being done to the recreational value of the lake. This would
lead to three possible outcomes:
1) First, the polluter can make such a payment and continue to operate profitably.
Continued pollution and factory production would be the socially optimal outcome.
2) Second, the polluter may find that it is less expensive to install pollution abatement
equipment than to pay for the damage done to the lake. Continued factory
production without pollution would be the socially optimal outcome.
3) Third, the polluter may not be able to pay the cost of their pollution in terms of
damage to the lake and continue to operate profitably. In this case, the cessation of
factory production (i.e., a reduction in economic activity) would be the socially
optimal outcome.
Note that in all three outcomes overall economic activity is maximized (depending on
the relative costs of the pollution and the value factory output) due to the imposition of costs
7

on the polluter. If the factory output is valuable relative to the lost activity at the lake as in
outcome 1), then overall economic activity is larger if factory production continues and lake
activity is lower due to pollution. Or, the factory owner may find it cheaper to install pollution
abatement equipment as in outcome 2). Finally, if factory output is not valuable relative to the
lost economic activity at the lake as in outcome 3), then overall economic activity is larger if
factory production ceases and lake activity increases to a higher level.
On the other hand, if pollution costs are not imposed on the polluter, then overall
economic activity will only be larger by coincidence, if it happens that outcome 1) is correct.
This is why the assignment of property rights provides a way to internalize an externality that
leads to an efficient outcome from an economics perspective.
As was noted earlier, however, it is not always feasible to assign property rights. In such
cases, the task of internalizing externalities may fall to regulators. In theory, the goal of the
regulator would be the same as the owner of the property. The goal would be to require the
polluter to make a payment equal to the costs imposed by their pollution as they continue to
both produce an output and pollute.2
In the case of greenhouse gas emissions, one would expect that all three types of
outcomes could occur if the costs of pollution, once measured (see Section A.), are imposed on
greenhouse gas emitters. Some emitters will continue to produce and pay for the right to
continue to produce. Some emitters will change technology, adopting over time low- or noemissions technologies, and continue to produce but without emitting greenhouse gasses.
Some emitters will cease production and the production of their product (usually energy, a
factory output, or transportation services) will decline. All three of these occur in the example
presented in Figure 2.2, at the equilibrium point C.
Such an outcome might be beneficial to the economy. Nonetheless, it is important to
note a key issue: it is not clear how much cost to impose on electrical power generators or
other emitters of greenhouse gases. This is because there is uncertainty about the cost of
greenhouse gas emissions to society.
2

More precisely, the polluter should pay the marginal cost of pollution at their current level of production.
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C. What is the Cost of Greenhouse Gas Emissions?
From the preceding theory it is evident that it is critical to be able to measure the size of
the external costs of pollution. This is never easy or precise, but methods do exist in many
cases. For example, the more immediate health effects of smog can be measured in terms of
health outcomes for older citizens, children, and asthmatics. In other words, the size of the
social costs of the externality can be measured with some accuracy (though there is certainly
debate and disagreement on the magnitude of this externality). But, having some amount of
clarity about the size of the external effect gives policy-makers the ability to choose the
efficient level of tax per unit of pollution, that is, the level of the taxation that is estimated to
lead to the economically-efficient level of economic activity.
Precise measurement is substantially more difficult in the case of greenhouse gas
emissions. The precise marginal influence of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere on climate
change is not clearly understood and is a subject of considerable debate. The timing of these
impacts is also a point of substantial uncertainty. In other words, to what extent do additional
greenhouse gas emissions at the current time relate to a change in climate now, in the decades
to come, and in the more distant future?
Even if these questions could be precisely answered, another uncertainty is the
economic costs associated with climate change. The climate may change but how would this
influence the economy? Some coastal cities may need to be moved or perhaps reinforced as
global temperatures rise, and factors such as quality of life, agricultural productivity, and water
supply may change in different regions of the globe. At the same time, costs may rise if weather
becomes violent or extreme in certain regions. More generally, if humans have settled and
concentrated in regions with a beneficial climate and environment, then factors that change
climate and environment may create a mismatch that is expensive to remedy.
The concern is that the marginal contribution of manmade factors to climate change
could produce significant costs. Manmade contributions to climate change could impose future
costs either directly by making our economy less productive or indirectly by curtailing future

9

economic growth as a substantial share of future investment must be devoted to mitigating the
impacts of climate change.
If the costs of the manmade contribution to climate change are substantial, there could
be substantial future economic benefits from minimizing or reducing greenhouse emissions.
Yet, as was noted earlier, there is uncertainty about the marginal contribution of greenhouse
gases and other manmade activities to climate change. There is also uncertainty as to whether
climate change resulting from manmade actions will lead to a modest future economic cost or
to a very significant economic cost, or to a moderate economic cost somewhere in between.
The implication is that efforts to regulate greenhouse gases and reduce the manmade
contribution to climate change will lead to a broadly uncertain outcome. Such an investment
could lead to relatively few benefits, or the investment could generate substantial future
benefits. The situation is a bit like the purchase of automobile insurance. A driver who chooses
not to purchase insurance may bear no cost or may bear a very substantial cost. Faced with this
reality, many drivers choose to bear a significant cost for insurance to avoid the risk of a
catastrophic outcome even though they may never need to file a claim. Drivers choose to do so
because they believe it is a rational decision, or because they simply do not have the financial
wherewithal to risk the catastrophic outcome.
Along the same lines, nations may choose to purchase “insurance” against the uncertain
impact of greenhouse gas emissions on the climate and the economy by regulating and
significantly reducing greenhouse gas emissions. However, any decision to purchase
“insurance” also depends on the size of the premium. How costly will regulation of greenhouse
gas emissions be to the economy? Societies may choose not to purchase this insurance if the
premium is too costly.3 We consider these costs to the economy in Chapters 3 and 4 of this
report.
Finally, it is also true that the public may have a preference for avoiding climate change
due to manmade sources on purely environmental grounds, even if there is no concrete cost to

3

Such a purchase of “insurance” by reducing greenhouse gas emissions would make little economic sense if one is
certain that the marginal contribution of greenhouse gas emissions to climate change and economic losses is small.
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the economy. Even in this case, the public still needs to understand the economic costs of
pursuing such an environmental goal. Once again, it would be useful to measure the costs to
the economy in terms of lower per capita income, gross domestic product, employment, and
farm and manufacturing activity from actions to limit greenhouse gas emissions, and we will do
so later in the report.

D. Points of Emphasis
This section features several points of emphasis that were mentioned earlier in this
Chapter, but require further discussion. We believe it would be useful for the reader to keep
these points of emphasis in mind when reading the specific analysis in Chapters 3 and 4.

Discounting of Future Events
Policy analysis often must consider the time value of money. This is because public
policies often impose costs and yield benefits that occur at different points in time. For
example, the costs of regulations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions would begin in the
present but might primarily influence climate change and economic consequences decades in
the future. To consider the relevant trade-offs, policymakers and the public must have a way to
compare future benefits with current costs. In particular, benefits in the future must be
discounted by the time value of money.4 The time value of money is often quite substantial. For
example a 7% annual discount rate effectively “halves” the value of benefits every decade. One
dollar of benefits occurring 10 years in the future would be worth $0.50 today, while $1 of
benefits 20 years in the future would be worth $0.25 today. Looking further into the future, $1
of benefits 50 years in the future would be worth $0.034 today, and benefits 100 years in the
future would be worth $0.001 today. Such discounting implies that economic benefits from
avoiding manmade contributions to climate change decades in the future will be heavily
discounted relative to current costs. The costs of manmade contributions to climate change
would have to be catastrophic to be comparable after discounting. However, some have argued
4

Costs over the next few decades also would need to be discounted but for fewer years.
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that regulating greenhouse gas emissions would make economic sense even with such
discounting. The argument centers around the uncertainty about the economic consequences
of climate change (Weitzman, 2007). Distributions under uncertainty tend to have “fat tails,”
meaning that the probability of an extreme outcome such as severe economic consequences
(or of very minimal consequences) is larger than in a typical risk distribution. In such a situation,
the present value of future economic consequences could be quite large even with heavy
discounting over time (Weitzman, 2007). In other words, bearing significant costs to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions could pass a benefit cost analysis even under the types of heavy
discounting described above.

Rearrangement of Global Industrial Production
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions has substantial potential to lower the returns to
private capital investment in industry, particularly in “heavy” industries that use energy
intensely or that directly release greenhouse gases in their own production (Interagency
Report, 2009). As noted earlier, production may decline in these industries with regulation of
greenhouse gas emissions. This is especially true because many such heavy industries compete
in an international market. Key competitors for these heavy industries may be located in
developing countries that do not currently regulate greenhouse gas emissions. U.S. producers
will face higher energy costs and perhaps their own pollution abatement costs after the
introduction of regulations on greenhouse gas emissions. U.S. firms in heavy industries will
operate at a competitive disadvantage as a result, and a larger share of heavy industrial activity
may shift overseas to countries that do not directly regulate greenhouse gas emissions. 5 To be
more precise, production in these heavy industries, and the power plants that produce energy
for these industries, may shift overseas to countries without greenhouse gas regulations. Heavy
industries and associated power production may in this way avoid the greenhouse gas
regulations. Similar phenomenon may also occur in other manufacturing or resources based
5

Some countries such as China that do not directly regulate greenhouse gas emissions do have programs to
promote the use of more costly renewable energy resources. This raises energy prices and has many of the same
impacts on the economy, and heavy industries within the economy, as direct greenhouse gas regulation.
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industries. The net result is that greenhouse gas emissions are not reduced as much as hoped
and the negative impacts on the U.S. economy are larger than expected.

13

Chapter 3: National Economic Consequences
This Chapter examines the potential consequences for the national economy from
proposed climate change legislation. Specifically, in this Chapter we focus on the major climate
change initiatives that were proposed in the 111th Congress, and note the potential for direct
regulation of greenhouse gas emissions by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.

A. Legislative and Regulatory Proposals
Climate and energy legislation similar to what was proposed in the 111th Congress could
have a substantial impact on energy and greenhouse gas emission prices. An analysis of the
proposed legislation from the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate provides a
baseline from which to consider the economic impact of climate and energy policies.
The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (H.R. 2454) was introduced by
Representatives Henry Waxman of California and Edward Markey of Massachusetts and
proposed a comprehensive set of provisions on clean energy, energy efficiency, and the
transition to a clean energy economy. Specifically, the legislation proposed to set a combined
energy efficiency and renewable electricity standard, to develop an energy productivity goal
and strategic plan, and to establish a cap and trade system for greenhouse gas emissions with
goals for reducing U.S. emissions from covered sources by 83% of 2005 levels by 2050. The
legislation would have required emissions reductions or purchases of emissions offsets by all
sources covered in the legislation. The Waxman-Markey bill passed the House on June 26, 2009
by a 219-212 roll call vote.
On the other side of Capitol Hill, Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts introduced S.
1733, the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act on September 30, 2009 with co-sponsor
Barbara Boxer of California. The bill, as reported from the Senate Committee on Environment
and Public Works on February 2, 2010, included provisions to establish a system for greenhouse
gas emissions with goals for reducing U.S. emissions by 83 of 2005 levels by 2050, to establish
goals and standards for transportation-related emissions reductions including vehicle and
14

engine emissions, and to establish standards for new coal-fueled power plants. Similar to the
House legislation, the Senate legislation would have required emissions reductions or
purchases of emissions offsets by all sources covered in the legislation. The Senate legislation
was not addressed on the floor and further efforts of Senator Kerry and Senator Joseph
Lieberman of Connecticut to develop a comprehensive energy and climate proposal have died
in this session of Congress.
In the absence of Congressional action on energy and climate legislation, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has indicated its plans to proceed with climate
regulation. A 2007 Supreme Court ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) found
that greenhouse gases are air pollutants covered by the Clean Air Act, providing EPA the
mandate to address greenhouse gas emissions under its existing authority. In December 2007,
the EPA Administrator published two findings regarding greenhouse gas emissions.
·

Endangerment Finding: The atmospheric concentrations of six specific greenhouse
gases - carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons
(HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6) - endanger public health
and welfare.

·

Cause and Contribute Finding: The emissions of these greenhouse gases from new
motor vehicles and motor vehicle engines contribute to atmospheric concentrations and
hence to the endangerment of public health and welfare.

The endangerment finding provides EPA the rationale for greenhouse gas regulations and
presents the pathway for a regulatory approach to greenhouse gas emissions in lieu of any new
legislation. This approach could move forward in the coming months even as Congress tables
comprehensive climate legislation. Potential EPA regulations could require targeted sectors
(initially large industrial emitters such as power plants, etc.) to control emissions. There have
been discussions of legislative proposals to prevent EPA from acting on the endangerment
finding, but none of those proposals have moved forward through Congress thus far and don’t
appear likely to in the remaining days of the current session.
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B. Structure of Recent Climate Change Legislation
The major climate change legislation from the 111th Congress included the WaxmanMarkey legislation (H.B. 2454), which ultimately was passed by the U.S. House of
Representatives, and the proposed Kerry-Lieberman legislation in the U.S. Senate. Both efforts
were complex legislation with many specific requirements but the core of both bills was a “cap
and trade” system for setting (and over time decreasing) the aggregate amount of greenhouse
gas emissions from covered sources in the United States. In a cap and trade system, the primary
approach of government regulators is not to cap the particular level of greenhouse emissions at
a particular power plant, factory, or other covered emitter at a point in time. Rather, the
approach of regulators is to distribute (either freely or through auctions) a specific number of
emissions allowances at each point in time. The emissions allowances are set to meet
regulatory goals for the total greenhouse gas emissions from covered sources in the United
States in any given year. Once distributed, the emissions allowances can then be traded among
parties. Further, these allowances are supplemented by offsets. Offsets can be purchased from
non-covered emitters of greenhouse gases (who would agree to reduce their emissions), or
from entities that sequester carbon. The end result is that covered emitters of greenhouse
gasses such as utilities can continue to make their own decisions about their level of
greenhouse gas emissions, but must submit allowances or offset credits equal to their amount
of greenhouse gas emissions.
Cap and trade legislation may provide flexibility to individual utilities, factories, or other
covered emitters, but cap and trade legislation imposes significant costs on the economy.
Essentially, over time utilities, factories, and other covered emitters must switch to alternative
methods of production that emit little or no greenhouse gases but are more expensive. This
substitution in the production process ultimately raises prices and reduces the size of the U.S.
economy. For example, higher prices in the utility industry reduce the quantity of electricity
demanded by households, commercial businesses, and industrial customers. This leads not just
to less energy production but to a curtailment of economic activity throughout the economy.
The reduction in economic activity is particularly large for manufacturers and others that are
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intensive users of electricity. Manufacturers, of course, also may be covered emitters subject to
cap and trade regulation and also may face by competition with manufacturers from countries
who do not regulate greenhouse gas emissions.
Both versions of cap and trade regulations propose to provide emissions allowances for
free to impacted parties such as utility companies and manufacturers in the first two decades of
the system before moving towards auctions to distribute the allowances. The distribution of
free allowances to utility companies permits the companies to limit the energy price increases
that curtail economic activity in these early decades. Similarly, free allowance distribution to
the most energy-intensive manufacturing sectors limits losses in these sectors in the first
decade of the program. The notion is that utilities and factories will have time to phase in lowor no-emission power plant capacity during the first two decades (EIA, 2009), and that new
technologies will be developed during that period. The time also can be used for producers to
identify and negotiate with potential providers of emissions offsets.
The cap and trade system also attempts to mitigate its consequences for the economy
by steadily reducing the number of emissions allowances over time, rather than immediately.
The amount of potential offsets, however, is fixed over time so the net effect of declining
allowances and fixed offsets is that the total amount of greenhouse gas emissions in the United
States falls over time. Emissions-allowance caps limit total annual carbon emissions to a
percentage of emissions in a previous year (typically 2005), and then incrementally reduce that
percentage over time. For example, the Waxman-Markey legislation capped greenhouse gas
emissions at 83% of 2005 emissions levels in the year 2020, to 58% of 2005 emissions levels in
the year 2030, and to 17% of 2005 emissions levels in 2050. The Kerry-Lieberman legislation in
the Senate follows a similar schedule. While there were differences, both pieces of legislation
also followed a similar system for the free allocation of allowances in earlier decades and the
use of offsets. These similarities mean that the economic consequences of the Waxman-Markey
legislation and the Kerry-Lieberman legislation are broadly similar. In fact, the projected
economic consequences of both pieces of legislation vary more based on the particular
economic scenario (such as how cost-effectively low- or no-emissions technologies can be
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implemented by utilities) than by the specifics of either the Waxman-Markey or KerryLieberman legislation. Thus, in our analysis, we focus more on how the economic
consequences of the two pieces of legislation will vary depending on key economic variables
than on how economic consequences vary between Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman.
This is particularly appropriate since it is highly unlikely that either piece of legislation would
become law, at least in the near future.

C. Economic Scenarios under Climate Change Legislation
Cap and trade legislation has consequences for the whole of the U.S. economy. Analysis
of the legislation therefore requires a flexible, comprehensive model of the U.S. economy,
including a very detailed modeling of the energy industry. The Energy Information
Administration’s (EIA) National Energy Modeling System (EIA-NEMS) is such a model. EIA-NEMS
tracks economic output, wages, prices, and employment in dozens in of industries and is used
to produce the Department of Energy’s periodic energy sector outlooks. Such an outlook, in the
absence of regulation, forms the reference case for EIA analysis using the EIA-NEMS model. The
EIA-NEMS model also was utilized to model the expected impacted of climate change
legislation on the U.S. economy. Economic activity and energy prices under climate change
regulation could be compared with similar values in the reference case scenario, in order to
isolate the consequences of climate change regulation on the economy. Specifically, the EIA
conducted analysis of both the Waxman-Markey legislation in the U.S. House of
Representatives and the Kerry-Lieberman legislation in the U.S. Senate.
The baseline regulated scenario in the EIA modeling assumes that low-emissions
technologies (renewables, nuclear power) are “developed and deployed on a large scale”
during the study period, and that there is ample supply of both domestic and international
offsets available for purchase (EIA, 2009). The model also assumed that polluters would curtail
emissions at a greater rate than required in order to amass a bank of emissions allowances that
could be used at later date. This behavior is anticipated because the requirements and costs for
reducing greenhouse emissions become even stricter in the future (EIA, 2009). In the baseline
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model, most of the reductions in greenhouse gas emissions through 2030 are achieved by
reducing emissions in energy production, and the vast majority of these reductions occur in
electric power through a decline in conventional coal power electricity production (EIA, 2009).
This occurs as low- or no-emissions technologies replace conventional coal capacity or as
declines in demand for electric power are met by reducing conventional coal production.
The Energy Information Administration in its analysis considered multiple alternative
scenarios. In its analysis of the Waxman-Markey legislation, the following were 5 alternative
scenarios (EIA, 2009). The first alternative scenario is the “No Bank Case,” which releases the
assumption that polluters bank pollution allowances for later use. The second case is the “High
Offset” case which assumes that international offsets can be quickly identified and used by
polluters. Both of these alternative scenarios should allow less costly compliance and lead to a
smaller decline in economic activity under the Waxman-Markey legislation. By contrast, the
“High Cost” case assumes that it is 50% more costly to utilize no- or low-emissions technologies,
while the “No International” case assumes that international offsets are not available to U.S.
polluters. The last scenario, the “No International/Limited” case assumes there are no
international offsets and no marginal improvement in the adoption of no- or low-emissions
technology. It will be particularly expensive to the economy to meet emissions caps under this
scenario. Note that a similar set of alternative scenarios also were considered in the EIA analysis
of the Kerry-Lieberman Senate legislation (EIA, 2010). Note also that the EIA models did not
consider any economic benefits from climate change legislation for the period under study. As
was discussed earlier, such benefits are more uncertain and are difficult to quantify. The focus
of the EIA modeling, as discussed in Chapter 2 of this report, was to consider the economic
“price” of regulating greenhouse gas emissions.
Looking across all of these scenarios, the two most important cost factors are: 1) the
availability of cost effective low- or no-carbon production technologies; or 2) the cost of
purchasing offsets that allow continued production using more carbon-intense technologies.
Thus, among the alternative scenarios, the “No International/Limited” scenario will by far have
the greatest potential to raise energy costs and reduce the size of the U.S. economy.
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Table 3.1 shows results from the EIA’s analysis of the Waxman-Markey legislation and
the Kerry-Lieberman legislation. All impacts are reported relative to the reference case
scenario, which factors in normal expectations for inflation. Recall that this reference scenario
represents projections for the economy and the energy industry in the absence of climate
change legislation. Therefore, results show how much each scenario affects the economy
relative to this unregulated reference case. Results are presented as percentage changes in
GDP, the price of electricity, electricity generation, and industrial production.

Table 3.1
Economic Consequences of Cap and Trade Programs by Scenario in the EIA-NEMS Reports

Variable

No
Base Case High Cost Int'l/Limited

Base Case

2020
Waxman-Markey
Electricity Price
Electricity Generation
Gross Domestic Product
Industrial Shipments

2.6%
-2.4%
-0.3%
-1.0%

4.4%
-1.3%
0.0%
-0.6%

No
Int'l/Limited

2030

4.1%
-2.7%
-0.5%
-1.0%

15.3%
-5.9%
-0.7%
-2.8%

19.5%
-7.1%
-0.8%
-2.5%

2020
Kerry-Lieberman
Electricity Price
Electricity Generation
Gross Domestic Product
Industrial Activity

High Cost

29.2%
-9.3%
-1.1%
-2.7%

77.4%
-16.6%
-2.3%
-6.8%

2035

5.7%
-1.7%
-0.1%
-0.7%

20.9%
-5.8%
-0.7%
-2.7%

25.7%
-4.5%
-0.4%
-2.8%

32.8%
-5.9%
-0.6%
-3.2%

84.8%
-13.7%
-1.8%
-7.7%

Source: EIA 2009 and EIA 2010

Analysis of the Waxman-Markey legislation runs through the year 2030. This was as far
out into the future that EIA-NEMS extended as of that year. By the year 2010, the EIA-NEMS
model was expanded to run through 2035. As a result, the analysis of the Kerry-Lieberman
legislation, which occurred during 2010, ran through the year 2035.
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Note that the size of the estimated economic consequences varies more by scenario
than between the two pieces of legislation. With the exception of electricity prices, results are
relatively modest in both the Base Case and High Cost scenarios, whether these scenarios were
used to analyze the Waxman-Markey legislation or the Kerry-Lieberman legislation. Economic
costs rise substantially, however, when comparing the economic consequences of the No
International/Limited scenario. This scenario, with both limited access to offsets and limited
ability to substitute towards no- or low-emissions production technologies, generates relatively
large consequences for energy prices, energy generation, GDP, and Industrial Shipments
whether under the Waxman-Markey or Kerry-Lieberman legislation. Results also grew
substantially from 2020 to either 2030/2035. As argued below, the larger results in these latter
years may be the most instructive findings.
In particular, when examining model results it is important to focus on results from the
year 2030 or year 2035. Rather than representing an outlier at the end of the analysis period,
the results for 2030/2035 may be the most representative of the cost of greenhouse gas
regulation. Results for the year 2030/2035 occur after the expiration of free-allowances. As a
result, economic impacts in 2030/2035 more accurately reflect the regulatory costs determined
by the availability of offsets and the potential to substitute towards renewable energy, nuclear
energy, or other no- or low-emissions technologies. This is especially true because after 2030 an
increasing share of the greenhouse gas emissions reductions will need to come from outside of
the electricity generation sector, and there is even less technological progress in this area (EIA,
2009). The practical implication of this is that the reader should put substantial weight on
2030/2305 cost estimates when evaluating EIA-NEMS model outputs for the 2015 to 2030/2035
period.
The lost economic activity, whether electricity generation, GDP, or Industrial Shipments,
doubles or more than doubles under the No International/Limited scenario compared to the
Base Case scenario. The loss in electricity generation is between 13.7% and 16.6% in 2030/2035
in the No International/Limited scenario. The overall decline in gross domestic product under
this scenario is 1.8% to 2.3% in 2030/2035. Industrial Shipments decline by 6.8% to 7.7% in
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2030/2035 in the No International/Limited scenario. These are substantial declines. In terms of
GDP, these declines are roughly equal to a year of GDP growth. Greenhouse gas regulation has
the potential to cause a loss of 1-year of GDP growth by 2030/2035. Declines in electric
generation and industrial shipments are much more severe. The larger effect occurs for
industrial shipments since this industry is among the largest and most intense users of energy.
While not listed in the Table, we note that the price of emissions allowances in 2030 under the
No International/Limited scenario is 190.5 2007$ per metric ton of CO2 equivalent under the
Waxman-Markey legislation, and 184.8 2008$ per metric CO2 equivalent under the KerryLieberman legislation.

D. Other Studies and Impact on U.S. Manufacturing
Besides the EIA analysis, we reviewed private sector studies examining proposed climate
legislation. One was the American Council for Capital Formation/National Association of
Manufacturers study (ACCF/NAM, 2009). The ACCF/NAM study utilized two additional scenarios
to analyze the Waxman-Markey legislation using the EIA-NEMS model. The study then reported
the resulting economic consequences. The ACCF/NAM study developed a “Low” and “High”
scenario for examination. However, in the context of the Energy Information Administration
Report, the assumptions of both the Low and High scenario in the ACCF/NAM are both similar
to the No International/Limited scenario in the EIA study (EIA-NEMS, 2009). In particular, the
ACCF/NAM assumes that there will be fewer offsets available to greenhouse gas emitters than
under the EIA-NEMS Base Case scenario and limits on the adoption of no- or low-emissions
technologies, as in the No International/Limited scenario. This was the scenario that included
two developments that were not part of the baseline analysis. The ACCF-NEM Low and High
Cost scenarios differ in assumptions about the adoption of these technologies. The High Cost
scenario is more restrictive in assumptions about the adoption of nuclear, biomass, and wind
energy.
Table 3.2 shows the projected economic consequences of the Waxman-Markey
legislation using the ACCF/NAM Low and High Cost scenarios. Results are presented for a
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similar set of economic measures as in Table 3.1, though the ACCF/NAM report also provides
estimates for the projected impacted on manufacturing employment. The ACCF/NAM report
shows smaller increases in residential energy prices than in the EIA No International/Limited
scenario, but still shows substantial prices increases by the year 2030 of 31.4% in the Low Cost
scenario and 50.0% in the High Cost scenario. The consequences for GDP are a 1.8% decline in
2030 under the Low Cost scenario and 2.4% under the High Cost scenario. These losses also are
similar to those found in the No International/Limited Case in the EIA analysis.
Results in Table 3.2 also show how much more severe the expected impact of
comprehensive climate change legislation is on the U.S. manufacturing sector. For example, in
2030, total employment is expected to be 1.1% to 1.5% less than in the reference scenario
under the Waxman-Markey legislation. By contrast, manufacturing employment would be 5.8%
to 7.3% less under the Waxman-Markey legislation compared to the reference scenario. The
employment impact would be concentrated in the manufacturing sector. This is particularly
evident if you consider that manufacturing employment accounts for around 10% of all
employment. The 5.8% to 7.3% decline in manufacturing employment would reflect a 0.6% to
0.7% decline in total employment, or about half of the total decline.
The significant decline in manufacturing activity is also evident in results for the
industrial output variable. In 2030, the ACCF/NAM report anticipates a 5.3% to 6.5% decline in
industrial output under the Waxman-Markey legislation compared to the reference scenario.
Similar declines were anticipated for industrial activity in the EIA analysis under the No
International/Limited scenario (the scenario most comparable to the ACCF/NAM analysis). The
EIA predicted a 6.8% decline in industrial activity in 2030 as a result of the Waxman-Markey
legislation and a 7.7% decline in industrial activity under the Kerry-Lieberman legislation.
Looking across all of the measures, analysis has predicted a decline of manufacturing
ranging from 5.8% to 7.7% under the comprehensive climate change regulation. This result
makes sense given that many manufacturing businesses use production methods that are
energy-intensive, manufacturing businesses have an intensive demand for transportation
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services, manufacturers are exposed to significant international competition, and some
manufacturing plants have their own greenhouse gas emissions.
Table 3.2
Economic Consequences of Cap and Trade Programs by Scenario in the ACCF/NAM Report

Variable

Low Cost High Cost

Low Cost

2020
Waxman-Markey
Employment
Gross Domestic Product (Millions 2007$)
Retail Electricity Price ($/KWH)
Industrial Output
Manufacturing Employment

0.0%
-0.2%
4.9%
-1.8%
-1.8%

0.0%
-0.4%
7.9%
-2.2%
-2.3%

High Cost
2030

-1.1%
-1.8%
31.4%
-5.3%
-5.8%

-1.5%
-2.4%
50.0%
-6.5%
-7.3%

Source: American Council for Capital Formation and National Association of Manufacturers

E. Impact on U.S. Agriculture
The impact of comprehensive climate legislation or regulations on U.S. agriculture is
substantial and widespread, but is also very dependent on the exact provisions that may be
enacted. Climate legislation or regulation would generate new costs for agriculture but may
also generate benefits. The exact magnitude of these costs and benefits depends on the exact
provisions of legislation or regulation. This section reviews the potential costs, potential
benefits, and the net costs of climate legislation for U.S. agriculture.

Potential Costs
Regulations on greenhouse gas emissions that drive up costs in carbon-intensive
industries and inputs such as transportation and energy could have a substantial effect on
agricultural input costs. Increased production and marketing costs would hurt the agricultural
sector in both the short and long run. The increased costs could also reduce production over
time and drive up agricultural commodity prices, partly offsetting the increased costs to
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agriculture, but also passing on increased costs to consumers. Regulations could also directly
affect agriculture if the sector is subject to emissions controls or costs for greenhouse emissions
from either crop or livestock operations. Both the Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman
legislative bills exempted agriculture from emissions regulations, and the initial target of any
EPA regulations appears to not be agriculture, but potential regulations on agriculture in the
future are unknown under either approach.
Two studies of the initial House legislation provide an estimate of the potential impact
of climate legislation and higher energy prices on agriculture. These studies predicted impacts
out to the year 2050, and therefore offer a longer timeframe than the EIA analysis. The Food
and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) at the University of Missouri used increased
energy cost estimates from CRA International to calculate the impact of climate legislation on
agricultural input costs. The estimated increased energy prices from CRA International included
motor fuel that is 4% higher than current baseline projections by 2020 and 11% by 2050;
natural gas that is 11% higher relative to baseline by 2020 and 34% higher by 2050; and
electricity that is 16% higher relative to baseline by 2020 and 45% by 2050. The FAPRI analysis
used several Missouri representative farms as the point of comparison and showed resulting
increases of 3-7% on fertilizer costs by 2020 and 9-19% by 2050 relative to a 2009 baseline
level. Fertilizer costs for corn are at the high end of the range, while soybeans are at the low
end of the range. The differences in cost increase are primarily based on the differences in
fertilizer use, particularly nitrogen. Natural gas is the predominant cost component in the
production of anhydrous ammonia, which is a primary source of nitrogen fertilizer and natural
gas price increases would be passed on through nitrogen fertilizer price increases. Machinery,
drying, and irrigation energy costs rise in line with motor fuel and natural gas costs and increase
4% and 12% over 2009 baseline levels by 2020 and 2050 respectively. Adding these increased
fertilizer and energy costs to other operating costs shows an increase in total operating costs of
approximately 2-4% by 2020 and 4-10% by 2050 relative to 2009 baseline levels.
Analysis by Bruce Babcock at the Center for Agricultural and Rural Development at Iowa
State University calculates potential costs on Iowa corn and soybean farms by estimating the
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carbon cost equivalent for various farm inputs. At a CO2 price of $20 per ton (a short-run price
level), the emissions costs of diesel fuel usage amounts to about $0.80 per acre per year.
Emissions from natural gas usage as the primary energy source in fertilizer production similarly
passed through as an increased cost of $2.85 per acre. And, and propane usage for grain drying
resulted in an emissions cost that averaged $0.87 per acre ($1.75 per acre for corn and $0 per
acre for soybeans). The total increased cost for fuel and fertilizer of $4.52 per acre represents
about a 1.5% increase from operating cost levels of around $300 per acre.
Both studies suggest small overall changes in crop production costs in the short run due
to climate legislation and greenhouse gas emissions costs. Increased energy costs imply similar
modest increases in livestock production costs as well. Several other studies generally confirm
the expected costs increases and their relatively minor levels of increase, but applying expected
energy cost changes to aggregate U.S. farm cost data shows the significance of even small
changes in costs. Farm income and cost data from the United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA) Economic Research Service shows the impact of cost changes relative to 2009 baseline
levels for three energy-sensitive cost categories and total farm costs and income.
Table 3.3
U.S. Aggregate Farm Cost Estimates
2009
Baseline
Level

Category
Fertilizer
Fuel and Oil
Electricity
Total Energy-Intensive Costs

2020 (Short Run)
Assumed
Cost
Increase Above
Increase
Baseline
(Million 2009 $)
(%)
(Million 2009$)

$20,136
$12,716
$4,590

6%
4%
16%

$37,441

$1,208
$508
$727
$2,444

2050 (Long Run)
Assumed
Cost
Increase Above
Increase
Baseline
(%)
(Million 2009$)

15%
11%
45%

$3,020
$1,399
$2,045
$6,464

Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture and author’s calculations

The estimated cost increases of $2.4 billion (2009$) in the short run and $6.4 billion
(2009$) in the long run relative to baseline levels amount to about 0.9% of all farm costs
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(purchased inputs, labor, land, capital, and taxes) by 2020 and 2.3% by 2050, but this also
represents 3.9% and 10.4% of net farm income in the short run and long run respectively. This
cost analysis overstates the negative impact on agricultural profitability of energy price
increases due to climate legislation. As noted in the explanation of potential costs, the
increased costs will lead to some contraction of supply and result in higher commodity prices
that are passed on to the consumer and offset some of the increased costs to agriculture. In
addition, EPA analysis of the proposed legislation suggests smaller increases in fertilizer prices
in the short run due to transitional allowances provided to energy-intensive and trade-exposed
industries. On the other hand, the cost estimates above do not consider the long-run effects of
changes in crop or enterprise mix due to energy price changes or the relative changes in costs
across countries that adopt similar climate legislation. Countries that do not adopt similar
climate regulations could gain a significant competitive advantage in production costs that
translates into some international shifts in agricultural production. And, the analysis assumes
agriculture is affected by climate legislation only through the impact on energy prices and
energy inputs in agriculture. Direct regulation of emissions in agriculture could add substantial
costs for the industry. Finally, the cost analysis does not consider any potential changes on
productivity or costs due to changes in climate associated with greenhouse gas emissions, nor
does it consider any productivity losses or costs avoided due to climate legislation or regulation.
Some studies have attempted to address the potential impact of increasing greenhouse gas
concentrations on agricultural productivity, but this analysis is confined to a static assessment
of marginal cost changes under potential legislation or regulation.

Potential Benefits
Regulations on greenhouse gas emissions could also benefit the agricultural sector if
increased costs on emissions translated into increased demand for reduced-emission biofuels
such as ethanol (both starch-based and cellulosic-based) or biodiesel. The biofuels industry has
grown substantially in the past few years, thanks in part to a complex mix of changing
technology and economics along with substantial government policies focused both on financial
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and environmental aspects of the industry. Greenhouse gas regulations that impose caps or
costs on emissions could further impact growth in the sector, with or without additional
policies. Regulations on greenhouse gas emissions may also benefit agriculture by rewarding
carbon sequestration efforts that include management practices such as conservation tillage,
nutrient management, or animal waste management, as well as land use practices such as the
establishment or maintenance of grassland or forest. These agricultural practices could be
directly rewarded through the value of carbon emission offsets in a carbon market (such as
through cap and trade). In addition, an increase in land devoted to grassland or forestry could
reduce other U.S. agricultural production and drive up agricultural commodity prices. Lower
U.S. production and higher commodity prices could encourage agricultural production increases
worldwide, partially offsetting the price effect, but constraints on U.S. production would likely
lead to lower total global agricultural output and higher commodity prices.
The proposed legislation would have provided major benefits to agriculture through an
opportunity to provide carbon offsets in the carbon market established by cap and trade
provisions along with no direct regulation of agricultural emissions. The EPA analysis considered
only some potential agricultural opportunities to provide carbon offsets. It showed a 50%
increase in amount of conservation tillage on cropland by 2020 based on an initial allowance
price of $15-per-ton CO2 rising at a real rate of 5% per year. Further analysis and testimony by
Joseph Glauber, Chief Economists for the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA),
before the U.S. House Committee on Agriculture Subcommittee on Conservation, Credit,
Energy, and Research confirms the primary opportunity for agriculture to earn carbon offset
income is in forestry. The USDA analysis is based on models of agricultural and forestry
responses to the potential changes in greenhouse gas emissions regulations and the market for
emissions offsets. Projected increases in prices for emissions offsets suggest an increase of 16.6
million acres in forest by 2020 and 59 million acres by 2050, with approximately 35 million acres
coming from existing cropland and 24 million acres from pasture. The afforestation changes
would generate $2 billion per year in agricultural offset income by 2020 and $24 billion year by
2050 (2004$), representing more than 80% of all agricultural offset income. The analysis
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conducted by USDA discusses shifts from cropland and pasture to forestry, but does not discuss
the fate of land enrolled in the Conservation Reserve Program CRP). Approximately 31 million
acres are currently enrolled in the CRP, a federal program that pays producers an annual rental
payment to temporarily retire cropland and other high-priority land from production. This land
could be a target for additional carbon sequestration activities or it could return to cropping as
other acres shift to forestry. But, current USDA policy appears focused on maintaining
enrollment in the CRP near its 32 million acre authorization, thus substantial acreage shifts out
of the CRP are not projected in the analysis.
In addition to the direct income from carbon sequestration practices, the predicted
reduction in agricultural production due to the combination of higher energy prices, changes in
production practices, and changes in land use are significant. Major field crop production rises
for one crop (grain sorghum, likely due to acreage tradeoffs with corn), but falls for the rest by
0.4-11.4% by 2020. By 2050, production falls by 10.2-31.5% for all of the major field crops. As a
result, crop prices rise from 8.1-56.5% by 2050 relative to a baseline scenario. Livestock
production suffers as well, falling 0.7-7.9% by 2020 and 2.1-22.7% by 2050 relative to the
baseline scenario. Corresponding livestock and livestock product prices increase by 2.2-9.0% by
2020 and 14.9-33.1% by 2050 relative to the baseline scenario. The reduced production in the
United States could be partially offset by increased production worldwide in response to higher
prices and potential competitive production differences based on different costs or regulatory
requirements. But, as noted above, constraints on U.S. production would likely lead to lower
total global agricultural output and higher commodity prices. These higher prices would provide
further benefits to U.S. agriculture, but once again would pass on increased costs to consumers.

Net Impact on U.S. Agriculture
The net impact of potential climate legislation or regulation on the profitability of
agriculture is very dependent on the exact provisions of proposed rules as well as the
assumptions and modeling parameters used to study the sector. Studies in general have found
relatively small increases in production costs due to higher energy costs and through higher
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energy costs passed through in higher fertilizer costs. Studies that model the resulting
production adjustments show small decreases in production and increases in price that partially
offset the higher energy costs. More significantly, the studies of potential legislation or
regulation assume large gains for agriculture based on the assumption that agriculture will not
be subject to regulations, but instead will be eligible to provide carbon offsets and earn income
from carbon sequestration activities. The USDA testimony by Glauber estimated the overall
annualized value on producer surplus or farm income from proposed climate regulations at $22
billion per year (in 2004 inflation-adjusted dollars). Adjusting to 2009 for reference, the $22
billion would be equal to approximately $25 billion in 2009 dollars, which is approximately 40%
of the 2009 U.S. net farm income of $62 billion.
In summary, this analysis of existing research generally confirms that U.S. agriculture
would benefit from climate legislation and regulation. The analysis does not consider potential
costs if agriculture is regulated instead of exempted. Nor does the analysis address the
potential benefits to agriculture or to society in general of taking actions that may mitigate
climate change or maintain agricultural productivity. But, the economic analysis does suggest
the gains are largely dependent on carbon offset revenues and increased commodity prices
from reduced U.S. agricultural production. And these gains to U.S. agriculture come at the
expense of consumers in the form of reduced supplies and higher prices.

F. Economic Consequences under Direct Environmental Protection Agency Regulation
The precise nature of planned EPA regulation of greenhouse gas emissions is not known.
The EPA has discussed plans to regulate a group of larger greenhouse gas emitters, but a
specific formal set of procedures has not been announced. Plans that have been discussed
suggest significant actions to reduce emissions by major current emitters. This implies that
there would be some of the economic costs identified above for cap and trade legislation,
including a reduction in generating capacity for conventional coal and increases in other types
of electric power capacity. There also would likely be an associated increase in electricity prices
with a negative impact on economic activity. However, it is unclear whether the magnitude of
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these changes will be smaller, the same, or even larger than the changes anticipated under the
Waxman-Markey or Kerry-Lieberman climate change legislation. As a result, we do not provide
specific estimates of economic consequences for the case of direct EPA regulation.
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Chapter 4: Economic Consequences in Nebraska
Nebraska has a diversified economy, so in many ways the impacts of climate change
legislation and regulation on the Nebraska economy will be similar to their impacts on the
national economy. However, the Nebraska economy differs from the national economy in a
number of important ways that will cause impacts to diverge. The first is that Nebraska has a
large agricultural sector that may have substantial opportunities to provide emission offsets.
The second is that Nebraska’s mix of energy producing assets is different than the national
average, so that the impact of climate change legislation on Nebraska utilities and energy prices
may differ as well. The third is that Nebraska has a lower concentration of the types of heavy
manufacturing industries that are most disadvantaged by climate legislation. This Chapter
addresses each of these issues and then examines several studies that have directly estimated
the impact of proposed cap and trade legislation on the state of Nebraska or regions within the
state.

A. Generating Capacity
As noted earlier, caps on or regulation of greenhouse gas emissions will curtail or
encourage various modes of generating electric power. In particular, analyses, whether from
the Energy Information Administration (EIA) or the American Council for Capital
Formation/National Association of Manufacturers (ACCF-NEMS), expected a significant decline
in conventional coal generating capacity under climate change legislation relative to the
reference case scenario. However, declining conventional coal generation also would be
replaced by other types of generation capacity. The ACCF-NEMS analysis, which generally
assumed limited growth in nuclear or renewable fuels capacity, predicted steep increases in
natural gas generating capacity. The EIA analysis reached a similar conclusion under its
scenarios that assumed limited growth in nuclear or renewable fuels capacity. Under EIA
scenarios that assumed rapid adoption of nuclear or renewable generation capacity, however,
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the EIA predicted rapidly growing shares for nuclear power and renewables and little change in
natural gas capacity.
With the movement away from conventional coal capacity, a natural question for
Nebraskans is whether generating capacity in this state is likely to be more or less impacted by
climate change legislation or other efforts to limit greenhouse gas emissions? This will depend
on the particular features of Nebraska generating facilities, but a rough analysis is possible by
looking at the current structure of generating capacity in Nebraska and the United States. This
is done in Table 4.1, which shows the share of generating capacity by type for the United States
and for Nebraska. Looking at broad categories, Nebraska and the United States have just under
70% of generating capacity in fossil fuels (such as coal or natural gas), and just over 30% in
nuclear power, hydroelectric, and renewable sources such as wind, solar, or biomass. The
primary difference between Nebraska and the United States is that Nebraska has a relatively
large share of capacity in conventional coal and a relatively small share of electric power
capacity in natural gas. The larger share of conventional coal production in Nebraska suggests
that a larger share of Nebraska generating capacity will be at risk of closure or reduced activity
under climate change legislation. This may even imply that electricity prices would be impacted
more in Nebraska than the nation as a whole, though electricity price increases will ultimately
result from the complex interaction of many factors.

Table 4.1
2008 Sources of Electric Power Generating Capacity in the United States and Nebraska
Energy Source
Coal
Natural Gas
Nuclear
Hydroelectric
Wind, Solar, Biomass,
Geothermal
Other

Percentage of Generation Megawatt Hours
United States
Nebraska
48.2%
66.3%
21.4%
2.3%
19.6%
29.3%
6.2%
1.1%
3.1%
1.5%

0.9%
0.1%

Source: Energy Information Administration
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The impact on electricity prices is critical for households and energy-intensive industries
of all kinds. The impacts may be especially critical for manufacturing businesses, since a
significant share of manufacturing businesses are intensive users of energy. The impact on
manufacturing in Nebraska is discussed in more detail in the next section.

B. Economic Consequences for Nebraska Manufacturing
Nebraska has a smaller share of its gross state product in manufacturing than the United
States overall. Manufacturing accounted for 10.7% of Nebraska gross state product in 2009
versus 11.1% of U.S. gross domestic product. This point alone suggests that economic
consequences of climate change legislation and regulation on the Nebraska economy may be
somewhat less severe than nationally. More importantly, Nebraska also has a smaller share of
its manufacturing activity in industries most vulnerable to decline as a result of cap and trade
legislation, or other efforts to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, as is evident in Tables 4.2 and
4.3 below.
Table 4.2 contains data from the American Council for Capital Formation/National
Association of Manufacturers (ACCF-NEM) study. That study included an estimate of the decline
in industrial activity, as measured by shipments, in 20 specific manufacturing industries. Table
4.2 presents the projected loss in industry shipments in 2030 due to the Waxman-Markey
legislation. Manufacturing industries are ranked according to the severity of the loss. All but 3
of 20 industries lose shipments. Primary metals lose nearly 30% of shipments under the High
Cost scenario and stone, clay, and glass products losses nearly 20% of shipments. Altogether,
the ACCF-NEM report expects that 7 of 20 industries will lose more than 10% of shipments in
2030, at least in the High Cost Scenario. Note that Nebraska has a smaller share of employment
in 6 of these 7 industries. Altogether, these 7 industries account for 35.5% of all manufacturing
employment in the United States, compared to 27.1% of Nebraska manufacturing employment.
At the same time, Nebraska has 37.4% of employment in food products, more than three times
the national average. Shipments in this manufacturing industry are expected to decline by just
3.4% in 2030, even in the High Cost scenario.
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Table 4.2
Nebraska Manufacturing Employment in Hard Hit Manufacturing Industries

Manufacturing Industry
Primary Metals Industry
Stone, Clay, and Glass Products
Machinery
Apparel
Electrical Equipment
Transportation Equipment
Wood Products
Petroleum and Coal Products
Fabricated Metal Products
Chemical Manufacturing
Computers and Electronics
Paper Products
Textile Mills and Products
Beverages and Tobacco Products
Food Products

Percent Loss in
Industrial Shipments
Low Cost High Cost
-22.5%
-29.2%
-14.1%
-18.2%
-12.4%
-15.5%
-11.2%
-15.4%
-9.3%
-11.8%
-8.1%
-11.1%
-8.0%
-10.9%
-8.9%
-9.2%
-6.2%
-7.8%
-5.8%
-7.3%
-5.8%
-6.9%
-5.1%
-6.5%
-4.2%
-5.7%
-3.2%
-4.0%
-2.5%
-3.4%

Percentage of
Manufacturing Jobs
Nebraska United States
1.8%
3.3%
2.8%
3.5%
10.4%
8.8%
0.1%
1.3%
2.4%
3.1%
7.5%
11.7%
2.1%
3.8%
0.1%
0.8%
8.9%
12.1%
3.6%
6.2%
4.2%
7.7%
1.4%
3.2%
0.5%
2.3%
0.4%
1.2%
37.4%
11.2%

Miscellaneous Manufacturing

-1.0%

-1.0%

5.0%

5.0%

Printing

-0.1%

-0.1%

3.6%

4.8%

Leather and Leather Products
Furniture and Related Products

0.0%
2.9%

0.0%
4.4%

0.2%
2.2%

0.2%
3.7%

Plastics and Rubber Products

7.5%

5.2%

5.4%

6.3%

Source: ACCF-NEM (2009) and County Business Patterns 2008
Table 4.3 lists Nebraska and United States employment in a group of manufacturing and
mining industries thought to be “Energy-Intensive, Trade-Exposed Industries”(Interagency
Report, 2009). These manufacturing and mining industries were identified to be especially
vulnerable to decline under the Waxman-Markey legislation. As the name suggests, these
industries would face significant cost challenges due to rising energy prices and would face
significant competition from rivals located in countries without such comprehensive
greenhouse gas regulation. Firms in such industries are scheduled to receive additional
emissions allowances in the first 15 years of Waxman-Markey implementation, but would
ultimately face rising costs.
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Table 4.3
2008 Nebraska and U.S. Employment in Energy-Intensive, Trade-Exposed Industries

NAICS Code: Description
212210: Iron Ore Mining
212234: Copper Ore and Nickel Ore Mining
312213: Malt manufacturing
311221: Wet Corn Milling
311613: Rendering and Meat Byproduct Processing
314992: Yarn Spinning Mills
314992: Tire Cord and Tire Fabric Mills
321219: Reconstituted Wood Product Manufacturing
322110: Pulp Mills
322121: Paper (except Newsprint) Mills
322122: Newsprint Mills
322130: Paperboard Mills
325110: Petrochemical Manufacturing
325131: Inorganic Dye and Pigment Manufacturing
325181: Alkalies and Chlorine Manufacturing
325182: Carbon Black Manufacturing
325188: All Other Basic Inorganic Chemical Manufacturing
325192: Cyclic Crude and Intermediate Manufacturing
325199: All Other Basic Organic Chemical Manufacturing
325211: Plastic Material and Resin Manufacturing
325212: Synthetic Rubber Manufacturing
325221: Cellulosic Organic Fiber Manufacturing
325222: Noncellulosic Organic Fiber Manufacturing
325311: Nitrogenous Fertilizer Manufacturing
327111: Vitreous China Plumbing Fixtures and China
327112: Vitreous China, Fine Earthenware, and Other
327113: Porcelain Electrical Supply Manufacturing
327122: Ceramic Wall and Floor Tile Manufacturing
327123: Other Structural Clay Product Manufacturing
327125: Nonclay Refractory Manufacturing
327211: Flat Glass Manufacturing
327212: Other Pressed and Blown Glass and Glassware
327213: Glass Container Manufacturing
327310: Cement Manufacturing
327410: Lime Manufacturing
327992: Ground or Treated Mineral and Earth
327993: Mineral Wool Manufacturing

Source: 2008 County Business Patterns
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Nebraska
Employment
2008
0
0
0
0
440
60
0
0
0
10
10
10
0
0
0
0
156
0
140
69
0
0
0
60
10
10
0
100
0
0
0
37
0
175
0
0
0

United States
Employment
2008
5,018
9,379
900
11,279
9,451
22,668
3,318
18,536
7,030
74,115
4,804
37,419
9,084
7,324
7,500
1,696
37,916
3,335
72,332
72,878
9,638
1,474
15,423
3,943
4,081
7,947
5,387
6,444
1,456
4,860
10,403
21,171
17,500
17,648
4,562
6,735
17,856

Table 4.3 (Continued)
2008 Nebraska and U.S. Employment in Energy-Intensive, Trade-Exposed Industries

NAICS Code: Description
331111: Iron and Steel Mills
331112: Electrometallurgical Ferroalloy Products
331210: Iron and Steel Pipe and Tube Manufacturing
331311: Alumina Refining
331312: Primary Aluminum Production
331411: Primary Smelting and Refining of Copper
331419: Primary Smelting and Refining of Nonferous Metal
331511: Iron Foundries
335991: Carbon and Graphite Product Manufacturing
Total Energy-Intensive, Trade-Exposed Industry Employment

Nebraska
Employment
2008
392
0
0
0
0
0
0
244
0
1,918

All Manufacturing
All Mining
Share of Manufacturing and Mining

104,997
884
1.8%

United States
Employment
2008
107,066
2,518
18,275
1,625
9,176
1,580
7,608
49,276
8,598
778,231
13,096,157
629,271
5.7%

Source: 2008 County Business Patterns
*Numbers have been rounded
Employment figures from the 2008 County Business Patterns Report of the U.S.
Department of Commerce are reported in Table 4.3 for both Nebraska and the United States.
Table 4.3 also shows Nebraska and United States employment in these energy-intensive, tradeexposed industries as a share of all manufacturing and mining employment. These industries
account for just 1.8% of Nebraska manufacturing and mining employment, but 5.7% of United
States manufacturing and mining employment. The share is more than 3 times as high for the
U.S. than for Nebraska.
Both Tables 4.2 and 4.3 suggest that the losses in manufacturing activity due to cap and
trade legislation or other regulation of greenhouse gases will not be as severe in Nebraska as
nationwide. That said, rising energy prices and direct cost impacts will be quite significant for
many individual Nebraska manufacturers, particularly in hard hit industries such as primary
metals production, glass production, and machinery manufacturers. Overall, however, the
decline in manufacturing activity relative to the unregulated case in 2030 may be more in the
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4% to 6% range rather than the 6% to 8% range projected nationally from sources such as EIA
and ACCF-NEM.

C. Economic Consequences for Nebraska Agriculture
The estimated impact of climate legislation or regulation on U.S. agriculture provides
some insight into the potential effects of legislation or regulation on Nebraska agriculture.

Potential Costs
Regulations on greenhouse gas emissions that drive up transportation and energy costs
will in turn drive up agricultural input costs in Nebraska in both the short and long run. The
studies and cost estimates referenced in the analysis of U.S. agricultural impacts also provide
some guidance on the scale of impacts on Nebraska. Nebraska costs for 2009 for selected
energy-intensive input categories were pulled from the same USDA Economic Research Service
database as used for national analysis. Assuming the same percentage increases from the
earlier analysis, projected cost increases relative to baseline levels in Nebraska in the short and
long run are shown in Table 4.4.

Table 4.4
Nebraska Aggregate Farm Cost Estimates
2009
Baseline
Level

Category
Fertilizer
Fuel and Oil
Electricity
Total Energy-Intensive Costs

2020 (Short Run)
Assumed
Cost
Increase Above
Increase
Baseline
(Million 2009$)
(%)
(Million 2009$)

$1,210
$596
$166

6%
4%
16%

$1,971

$73
$24
$31
$128

2050 (Long Run)
Assumed
Cost
Increase Above
Increase
Baseline
(%)
($ Million 2009$)

15%
11%
45%

$182
$66
$87
$334

Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture and author’s calculations
The estimated cost increases of $128 million (2009$) in the short run and $334 million
(2009$) in the long run relative to baseline levels amount to about 0.9% of all farm costs
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(purchased inputs, labor, land, capital, and taxes) by 2020 and 2.3% by 2050, the same
percentage as U.S. aggregate farm cost levels. This represents 4.5% and 11.7% of Nebraska’s
$2.9 billion in 2009 net farm income when analyzing the short run and long run respectively.
Both percentages are higher than in the U.S. aggregate net farm income comparison earlier. A
greater concentration in Nebraska of general commodity production and a large livestock
production sector that operates on smaller profit margins relative to value of production means
Nebraska generally lives with smaller net farm income margins. Thus, cost increases in
Nebraska that are similar to U.S. numbers can result in a greater percentage impact on
Nebraska agriculture’s bottom line.
As with the U.S. analysis, these cost estimates likely overstate the negative impact of
climate legislation or regulation on Nebraska agriculture. At the U.S. level, there are projected
downward adjustments for both fertilizer usage and major crop acreage. The fertilizer usage
may fall in Nebraska as well, particularly with the concentration of high-fertilizer-use corn
acreage in the state. Still, major acreage shifts are likely to occur outside of Nebraska in states
that are at the margin of major crop production regions. Eastern and Central Nebraska remain
in the heart of corn and soybean production while Western Nebraska remains in the heart of
the High Plains wheat production region. The crop acres in Nebraska are not likely to be the
first to shift out of production, so the increased energy costs will largely be passed on to
Nebraska producers. The primary offset to these costs will be the projected increase in
agricultural prices consistent with declines in production primarily in other regions of the
country.
There are other limitations to the analysis that are similar to the discussion of U.S.
impacts. Potential changes in crop or enterprise mix due to energy price changes or relative
changes in costs across countries are not assessed. Potential direct regulations of agricultural
emissions are also not considered, but could be substantial, particularly for Nebraska’s large
livestock industry. Also, the analysis focuses on changes in profitability due to changes in
energy prices. The analysis does not consider any potential changes in productivity or costs due
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to changes in climate associated with greenhouse gas emissions nor does it consider any
productivity losses or costs avoided due to climate legislation or regulation.

Potential Benefits
Nebraska agriculture is also in line to benefit from some of the potential climate
legislation or regulations. Nebraska is the second leading producer of ethanol in the United
States, with nearly 15% of the nation’s current 13.1 million gallons of operating production
capacity (Renewable Fuels Association and Nebraska Ethanol Board). Any growth in demand for
reduced-emission biofuels such as ethanol as a result of tighter regulations or higher costs on
emissions could help Nebraska’s biofuels industry and Nebraska agriculture as the provider of
feedstocks to the industry.
The other primary benefit for Nebraska agriculture is the opportunity to provide carbon
credits or offsets in a market for greenhouse gas emission allowances. While proposed
legislation would have established an opportunity for agriculture to provide carbon credits, it is
not clear whether such an opportunity would be part of any proposed EPA regulations.
Regardless, an analysis of the potential impact on Nebraska if carbon offsets from agriculture
are allowed provides some insight in the potential benefits. At the national level, EPA analysis
of the climate legislation assumed no net increase in carbon sequestration on agricultural lands
- increased conservation efforts were offset by shifts in land use out of agriculture and into
forestry. Yet, if the conclusion above regarding minimal shifts in Nebraska acreage holds, then
Nebraska producers may be able to enhance their management practices to sequester more
carbon and earn credits for sale in an emissions allowance market. While there are several
practices that could generate carbon credits, a look at the adoption and maintenance of
conservation tillage practices and the transition of cropland to permanent grassland provides
the most insight for this analysis.
Research and literature on carbon sequestration through agricultural practices provides
varied estimates of potential sequestration. A paper from 2002 published in the Journal of Soil
and Water Conservation by Eve, et al. identified potential sequestration rates for different
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practices in the major U.S. agricultural growing regions. The study estimated potential carbon
sequestration in converting conventional tillage to conservation tillage at 0.40 metric tons (MT)
of CO2 per acre per year in the Northern Plains region including Nebraska, with a higher rate of
0.54 MT CO2 per acre per year in the Corn Belt states east of Nebraska. A separate source of
carbon sequestration rate estimates comes from the contractual standards used by the Chicago
Climate Exchange (CCX). While the exchange’s trading volume for voluntary offsets has declined
in the past year, the established protocols that exist for offset contracts sold on the exchange
provide standard sequestration rates for different practices across the country. For
conservation tillage, the CCX sets a rate of 0.6 MT CO2 per acre per year for much of the eastern
United States as well as central and eastern Nebraska and irrigated crop production systems in
the rest of the state. For the remaining dryland production systems in the state, the rate varies
between 0.2 and 0.4 MT CO2 per acre per year (assumed at 0.3 MT CO2 per acre per year).
Nebraska has approximately 18.3 million acres of cultivated crop and hay acres in the state
(National Agricultural Statistics Service). The breakout of these acres by region is shown in Table
4.5 along with an estimate of existing conservation tillage practice adoption (based on
Horowitz, et al.) and calculated carbon sequestration levels.
In calculating potential carbon sequestration on Nebraska cropland, one complicating
factor is whether only new sequestration will be credited or whether existing sequestration
achieved by “good actors” will also earn credits. Rewarding only new sequestration would apply
credits only to actual new reductions in emissions, and not rewarding existing efforts would
create a perverse incentive to till existing conservation acres and then re-introduce them as
“new” acres that earn credits, while releasing substantial stored carbon in the process. If new
and existing efforts are rewarded, Nebraska could theoretically earn up to 9.967 million MT CO2
credits per year. In the short run at an assumed real price of $20 per ton, those credits could be
worth up to $199 million. In the long run at an assumed real price of $70 per ton, the credits
could be worth $698 million. In both cases, the carbon offsets would be sufficient to more than
offset the losses associated with higher energy costs and higher agricultural input costs.
However, the potential credits are a theoretical ceiling and actual credits could be substantially
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less based on whether existing practices get any credits and based on the reality that not all
acres could be effectively converted to conservation tillage to earn carbon credits.
There are other credits potentially available. Converting cropland to permanent
grassland is credited at 1.0 MT CO2 per acre per year in Nebraska in the CCX contract standards.
If we assume from the earlier discussion that not many Nebraska acres would be converted
from cropland, then this potential benefit is small. But, Nebraska does have 1.1 million acres
currently enrolled in the CRP. Of that acreage, approximately 788,000 acres are established in
grassland. At the CCX rate, those CRP acres could be worth an additional $16 million per year in
the short run (at the assumed real price of $20 per ton) and $55 million per year in the long run
(at the assumed real price of $70 per ton).

Table 4.5
Crop Acres, Conservation Tillage, and Carbon Sequestration in Nebraska

Acres

Assumed
Existing
Conservation
Tillage
(Percent)

Carbon
Sequestration
Assumed Rate
(MT CO2/
acre/year)

From
Existing
Practices
(MT CO2 /
year)

From
Potential
New
Practices
(MT CO2 /
year)

Cultivated Crop Acreage
Irrigated
Dryland - West
Dryland - Central and East

7,684,000
1,762,500
6,104,100

75%
75%
75%

0.6
0.3
0.6

3,457,800
396,563
2,746,845

1,152,600
132,188
915,615

Hay Acreage
Irrigated
Dryland - West
Dryland - Central and East

330,000
1,514,000
856,000

100%
100%
100%

0.6
0.3
0.6

198,000
454,200
513,600

0
0
0

Total

18,250,600

7,767,008

2,200,403

Category

Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture and author’s calculations
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Finally, the biggest potential sequestration nationally is assumed to come from
afforestation; however, the Eve, et al. study of sequestration rates does not even estimate
potential carbon sequestration from afforestation in the Northern Plains presumably due to a
lack of suitability for establishment of forestry in the region. Thus, there is little expectation of
substantial credits earned in Nebraska. The biggest impact in Nebraska from the afforestation
will be the impact on commodity prices due to acreage shifts in other parts of the country. The
decline in U.S. crop acreage and the corresponding increase in crop prices could offer
substantial benefits to Nebraska agriculture, especially if the acreage shifts in Nebraska are
small as was assumed earlier. However, the gains will be partially offset by the increased feed
prices to Nebraska’s livestock sector and the expected reduction in livestock production as a
result.

Net Impact on Nebraska Agriculture
As with the national analysis, the net impact of potential climate legislation or
regulation on Nebraska agriculture is very dependent on the exact provisions of proposed rules
as well as the assumptions and modeling parameters used in the studies. In general, Nebraska
agriculture would see modestly higher production costs in the short run and somewhat greater
cost increases in the long run relative to baseline levels, but those cost increases are a larger
share of net farm income in the state and therefore represent a significant economic shock to
the sector. Limited acreage shifts in Nebraska likely mean these costs are largely realized, but
they will be offset to some extent by cuts in fertilizer usage and acreage nationally that drive up
commodity prices. Nebraska agriculture could benefit from climate legislation or regulation if
new rules lead to increased demand for biofuel production, of which Nebraska is a leading
producer. Nebraska agriculture could also benefit by sequestering carbon and earning carbon
credits if agriculture is allowed to do so and if “good actors” are rewarded for carbon already
sequestered through existing practices. The carbon credits earned by Nebraska agriculture
could exceed the increased input costs under analyzed scenarios. While costs are projected to
increase $128 million over baseline estimates in the short run, carbon credits from conservation
tillage could be worth as much as $199 million in the short run. In the long run, costs are
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projected to increase $334 million over baseline estimates while carbon credits from
conservation tillage could be worth as much as $698 million. In addition, land use changes
nationally away from cropland and grassland to forestry could benefit Nebraska agriculture by
driving up commodity prices, although the Nebraska livestock sector would also have to absorb
higher feed costs in the process.
In summary, Nebraska agriculture could benefit from climate legislation or regulation
based on the analysis above, but, as with the national results, the gains are largely dependent
on carbon offset revenues and increased prices from reduced agricultural production. The
analysis does not consider potential costs to Nebraska agriculture if agriculture is regulated
instead of exempted and the analysis does not consider the cost to consumers of reduced
production and higher commodity prices.

D. Economic Consequences for Nebraska
Several of the national studies of cap and trade legislation broke out estimated
economic consequences to the State level. For example, the American Council for Capital
Formation-National Association of Manufacturers (ACCF-NEM) study produced an estimate of
the impact of the Waxman-Markey legislation for each of the 50 states. These estimates were
broken out from the national estimates in the ACCF-NEM report, which were discussed in
Chapter 3. Table 4.6 below summarizes the estimated impact of that legislation for major
economic indicators for Nebraska. Once again, results are presented for the Low Cost and High
Cost scenarios developed by ACCF-NEM. Recall that both of these cases corresponded roughly
to the No International/Limited scenario in the Energy Information Administration (EIA)
analysis. This was the highest cost scenario developed by EIA.
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Table 4.6
Economic Consequences for Nebraska of Cap and Trade Programs by Scenario in ACCF/NAM
Report
Variable

Low Cost

High Cost

Low Cost

2020
Waxman-Markey
Employment
90
-610
-14,420
Gross State Product (Millions 2007$)
-$71
-$122
-$750
Residential Electricity Prices ($/KWH)
$0.007
$0.001
$0.023
Note: Results presented in $/MMBTU and converted to $/KWH by authors
Source: ACCF/NAM (2009).

High Cost
2030
-19,630
-$1,023
$0.028

Results show that there are also substantial impacts at the state level. This can be seen
most clearly in the estimated impact on employment. Results show modest employment losses
for the year 2020, but then economic consequences grow between 2020 and 2030, just as in
the national analysis as emissions allowances become more costly. Nebraska is expected to
have between 14,400 and 19,600 fewer jobs in 2030 with the Waxman-Markey legislation,
depending on the scenario. In other words, employment will continue to grow in Nebraska
between 2010 and 2030, but it will grow by 14,400 to 19,600 fewer jobs. This is the equivalent
of 1 to 2 years of “lost” employment growth.
Results in Table 4.6 indicate meaningful economic consequences for the State of
Nebraska, just as was found at the national level, but the key issue is: will losses be more or less
severe in Nebraska than nationwide? This issue is examined in Table 4.7, where the losses in
Table 4.6 are put in terms of the percentage of the Nebraska economy. Once in percentage
terms, state losses can be compared with the percentage losses at the national level examined
in Chapter 3.
Results suggest that the percent increase in retail electricity prices increases would be
similar in Nebraska and the United States under ACCF-NEM’s lower cost scenario. However,
Nebraska price increases would be less severe than national price increases in the High Cost
scenario. The 2.3 cents/kwh to 2.8 cents/kwh price increases predicted for 2030 residential
electricity prices in Nebraska in the ACCF-NEM analysis of the Waxman-Markey legislation
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represent a 27.6% to 33.6% price increase over the base case/reference scenario. 6 Further,
even these substantial increases may be on the low end of possible price changes. Analysis by
the Omaha Public Power District estimates that retail rates (including residential, commercial,
and industrial customers) would rise by 97% by 2030 under Waxman-Markey legislation and by
89% under the Kerry-Lieberman legislation.
Looking at other measures, ACCF-NEM estimates of job loss in Nebraska are very similar
to national losses. In 2030, Nebraska employment would be 1.2% to 1.7% lower compared to
the reference case under the Waxman-Markey legislation, similar to the percentage decline
nationwide. ACCF-NEM estimates for GDP loss, however, would be less severe in Nebraska than
nationwide. This result is at odds with the findings for employment and residential electricity
rates. This may occur in part because business activity losses under Waxman-Markey (outside
of energy sectors) are most severe in the manufacturing sector, and the Nebraska
manufacturing sector has a lower share of business activity in the portions of the
manufacturing sector that are hardest hit by the Waxman-Markey legislation. This result also
may occur given that Nebraska has a large agricultural sector that could be lightly impacted by
climate change legislation or regulation.

6

For baseline scenarios, we assumed that employment, gross state product, and electricity prices grew at the
same rate in Nebraska between 2007 and 2030 as each grew nationally under the reference scenario in the ACCFNEM report.
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Table 4.7
Percent Economic Consequences for Nebraska and United States of Cap and Trade Programs
by Scenario in ACCF/NAM Report

Variable

Low Cost High Cost

Low Cost

2020
Nebraska
Employment
Gross Domestic Product (Millions 2007$)
Residential Electricity Price ($/KWH)
United States
Employment
Gross Domestic Product (Millions 2007$)
Residential Electricity Price ($/KWH)
Source: ACCF/NAM (2009).

High Cost
2030

0.0%
-0.1%
8.8%

-0.1%
-0.1%
1.3%

-1.2%
-0.5%
27.6%

-1.7%
-0.7%
33.6%

0.0%
-0.2%
4.9%

0.0%
-0.4%
7.9%

-1.1%
-1.8%
31.4%

-1.5%
-2.4%
50.0%
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Chapter 5: Summary
This document summarized key economic issues surrounding climate change legislation
and regulation and considered the potential implications for Nebraska. We began with a
discussion of economic theory and principles that pertain to climate change policy, and then
proceeded to evaluate the economic consequences of climate change legislation and regulation
for the nation in general, and Nebraska in specific.
We demonstrated that economic theory suggests that a tax can be used to ensure that
polluters consider the negative externalities of pollution on society. Such a tax, or alternative
approach such as a cap and trade system, however, must be set at the appropriate level to
reflect externality costs. The difficulty in the case of any type of pollution is that there is often
uncertainty about the true social costs of emissions. This issue is particularly difficult in the case
of greenhouse gas emissions, given that there is uncertainty as to the precise manmade
contribution to global warming and to how much this increase in global warming will impact the
economy. Economic consequences also may occur decades in the future, and thus will be
heavily discounted. Despite this uncertainty, the public may choose to regulate and reduce
greenhouse gas emissions, either in order to reduce the chances of a severe economic
outcome, or out of a concern for the environment that is unrelated to economic issues.
When making such a decision, however, it is critical to understand the cost to the
economy of the proposed regulation. As a result, we considered the potential economic
consequences of recent proposed legislation to limit greenhouse gas emissions. For our
analysis, we used the example of recent climate change legislation in the United States House
of Representatives (Waxman-Markey) and in the United States Senate (Kerry-Lieberman). Our
review of literature and analysis found that either of these versions of cap and trade legislation
would likely lead to a 2% reduction in U.S. GDP by the year 2030 relative to a reference scenario
without climate change legislation. Losses in U.S. GDP may be less severe in the decades leading
up to 2030, but also may be just as severe after 2030. Retail electric prices also are expected to
rise by 30% to 70% by 2030 under the climate change regulation, depending on the scenario.
The manufacturing sector will be especially hard-hit, with a 5% to 7% decline in industrial
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output and manufacturing employment, given that the energy-intensive, internationally
competitive manufacturing sector is expected to be hard-hit by increases in energy prices.
The economic consequences might be expected to be more modest in Nebraska,
however. The state has a smaller share of manufacturing activity in the hardest-hit segments of
the industry. And, the state has a large agricultural sector which may be impacted lightly or
even benefit from climate change legislation or regulation. Based on analysis of production
agriculture and gross state product, agriculture has produced an average of about $5 billion in
net value added in the past five years out of an average gross state product of about $77 billion
for a 6.5% share. This compares to a 1.1% share nationwide.
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